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support.I. Introduction
Many economists and policy makers hold that export and trade spur economic development.
With globalization, there is potential to export goods to far-oﬀ markets, and many see trade as
a way to raise incomes in the developing world. Yet how is this export accomplished? How can
local production reach the global marketplace? What contractual problems do exporters face?
This paper examines these questions.
We consider the microeconomics of export procurement. The paper builds a heuristic model
of transactions between exporters and local producers. We relate the model to the operations
of a large multi-national company, the East India Company (EIC), whose records provide a
rich source of information on problems of contracting for export. We focus on a venture that is
especially well-documented: textile procurement in Bengal in the second half of the 18th Century.1
Textiles, produced at home by weavers dispersed across the countryside, were the Company’s most
important export to Europe.2 The Company primarily procured these textiles using the “Agency
System,” where the EIC hired local employees — agents — to transact with weavers. Typical
agreements with weavers speciﬁed a loan for working capital, the quality and quantity of cloth
to be produced, and quality-contingent prices. But the system did not work so well. It was
fraught with "corruption" - or opportunistic behavior - on the part of the agents, the weavers,
and oﬃcials of the EIC itself.
We build a model of this procurement system and highlight two problems we see throughout
the historical record. Agents often did not uphold pricing agreements and cheated the weavers,
and weavers often sold output to other buyers and thereby did not repay their debts. Our analysis
shows the diﬃculty of solving both problems at the same time. If the EIC gave the agent more
authority to prevent outside sales, it simultaneously gave the agent a greater ability to hold-up the
weaver and not pay speciﬁed prices. In the history we see that the EIC struggled to ﬁnd the right
balance. The model shows how this balance depends on the market structure, the specialized
1“Bengal” here refers to the regions that eventually became Bangladesh and three states in independent India:
West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Our sources include Jones (1918), Marshall (1976), Sinha (1956), Wright (1961)
and, especially, Hossain (1988) and Mitra (1978).
2By the 1750’s textiles accounted for more than 80% of the value of British exports from Bengal (Chaudhury
(1995, p. 182)).
1nature of the good, and uncertainty over local bargaining between the agent and producer.
The study provides lessons for historical and present-day procurement. The EIC’s procurement
process is a typical one: there is an advance of working capital or inputs, goods are produced and
then delivered at a later date when ﬁnal compensation is made. If long-term agreements cannot be
enforced, the basic setting falls within the general paradigm of incomplete contracting (Grossman
and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), Williamson (1975)). We see this theory come to life
in the EIC records. Two parties make speciﬁc investments: the company and agent advance
funds to a producer, and the producer makes the cloth to the buyer’s speciﬁcations. The terms
of the agreement are diﬃcult to enforce, hence there is potential for opportunistic behavior on
both sides. While the general consequences of hold-up are well-known, the closest paper we know
to our model is Edlin and Hermalin (2000), which explicitly gives the producer property rights
over the output, allowing him to sell to another buyer.3 The development literature emphasizes
producers who can renege on debt agreements, but a buyer who can renege on an agreement with
a producer does not often appear, with Banerji and Duﬂo (2000) being a notable exception.4
To our knowledge there is no analysis of the situation, likely to be quite common, where both
problems and outside sales are present.
We present a stylized (one could say reduced form) model of one-time interaction between
an exporter and a local producer. We ask when the exporter, its agent, and the producer all
have incentives to uphold contract terms. An alternative approach would be a model of repeated
interaction. Absent competition, such a model could yield the familiar result that if players are
suﬃciently patient, gains from trade can be consistently realized. While this may be an accurate
description of interactions in some settings, we often do not see such behavior in our study of
textile procurement. We will describe competition among buyers and contractual violations by
producers, agents, and exporters who do not seem to fear future retaliation and do not seem to
be thinking long-term. We elaborate reasons for this outcome in Section IV.
Beyond the EIC’s textile venture, we study the (in)famous opium operations and the land
3Another literature studies problems due to producers’ hidden characteristics (e.g. Rauch and Watson (2003)).
4Bardhan (1980, 1989) provides overviews of this literature. McMillan and Woodruﬀ (1999), Biggs et al. (2002),
and Fafchamps (1997) discuss trade credit. There is also an extensive literature on interlinkage as a solution to
moral hazard and enforcement problems in credit contracts in agriculture.
2tax collection eﬀorts in eastern India, and we study present-day contract farming in developing
countries. Our model indicates that successful procurement requires a balance of bargaining
power between the agent and the producer. In the textile case, the EIC faced two diﬃculties in
maintaining this balance. First, competition from other buyers gave weavers the ability to sell
elsewhere. Second, the EIC was not able to monitor its agents and faced uncertainty regarding
the agent’s ability to enforce the contract. In later opium operations, both of these problems
were less salient. The Opium Agency, initiated by the EIC, was an explicit and declared monop-
sony/monopoly — all legal poppy cultivation was for the Agency, and sale was only through the
Agency. Though there was some smuggling, local producers had fewer outside options. To curb
agents’ opportunism, the Opium Agency hired personnel and instituted procedures to monitor key
transactions with cultivators. We argue these two features were complementary; the monopsony
mitigated the hold-up ability of the producer, and monopoly rents from selling a highly lucrative
product provided the funds and the incentive to invest in a monitoring system.5 Our study of the
East India Company’s eﬀorts to collect land taxes supports this interpretation of procurement
operations.6 The Company again relied on local agents, and we see a similar struggle to give
agents the right amount of power in their tax collection eﬀorts and dealings with tenant farmers.
Today, many companies use similar systems, called "Contract Farming," to procure products
such as coﬀee, fruit, and other export crops. Exporters advance funds to farmers, and often
provide technical assistance. In return, the farmer is obliged to sell the crop to the exporter.
We again often see that procurement breaks down. When there are many competing buyers,
producers take advances from one company and sell to another. As our model indicates, however,
a monopsony could give the exporter too much power, and, unless the exporter can police itself
and its employees, opens the door to hold-up of producers. We discuss examples of this outcome
as well.
This paper contributes to the study of the role of institutions in economic growth and develop-
ment. Following Douglass North (1990), economic historians have explored how institutions can
foster expanding trade. Greif (1993), a prominent example, shows how a community of traders
5The Company’s own management also became less corrupt. We elaborate below.
6The EIC collected land taxes in its role as Diwan of Bengal. See the historical review below.
3successfully transported goods from one port to another, despite agency problems. Our study
c o n s i d e r sh o wg o o d sm a k ei tt op o r ti nt h eﬁrst place. Several papers study the internal manage-
ment of the EIC and other trading companies (e.g. Carlos and Nicholas (1990), Hejeebu (2005)).
None of this work focuses on contractual relations with producers, which is our main interest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the historical
background of the EIC and its textile procurement in Bengal. Section III presents a model of
export procurement. Section IV draws on the model and discusses the evolution of the EIC’s tex-
tile procurement policies, the Opium Agency, and land tax collection eﬀorts. Section V discusses
present-day contract farming. Section VI concludes.
II. The EIC In Bengal and Textile Procurement
The English East India Company was founded in 1600 with a monopoly on English trade with
Europe from east of the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan. The EIC operated in
many parts of the world, including the American colonies, India, and China. We study operations
in eastern India after 1757, when, in the Battle of Plassey, the East India Company defeated the
Nawab of Bengal, establishing itself as the dominant political authority. The Company’s de facto
power gradually became de jure power: after initially operating via client rulers, the Company
took control of ﬁnancial administration and revenue collection in 1765, formally took over civil
and judicial administration in 1772, and eliminated the Nawab’s last remaining role, in admin-
istration of criminal law, in 1790.7 The British gradually established an administrative system.
Substantial eﬀorts to curb corruption among top-level (European) employees began towards the
end of the eighteenth century, and selection and management procedures were subsequently fur-
ther improved. To govern a vast and unfamiliar territory the Company relied heavily on Indian
7After becoming Diwan in 1765, the Company initially left much of the administration, including the judiciary,
to the Nawab’s oﬃcers. This awkward arrangement was abandoned in 1772 when, under Warren Hastings, the
ﬁrst Governor-General, the Company explicitly took over civil and judicial administration. At the outset a civil
court, known as Diwani Adalat, was established in each district, headed by the "collector," the Company oﬃcial
in charge of collection of land revenue. Over the next few decades the system was modiﬁed repeatedly. In 1773 the
collectors were replaced with Indian judicial oﬃcers (naibs) whose work was supervised by one of six "Provincial
Courts" that were in the charge of Company oﬃcials. When the burden on these courts became too great, British
oﬃcials were again dispersed through 18 mofussil (district) Diwani Adalats which, henceforth, were central to the
civil judiciary (Misra (1959, 1961)).
4intermediaries;8 eﬀective procedures for their supervision evolved slowly and were consolidated
only by the second half of the nineteenth century (Robb (1997)). We will see how the increas-
ing ability to monitor employees and enforce contracts aﬀected the textile, opium, and land tax
collection ventures.9
We ﬁrst study the East India Company’s cotton textile operations. Textiles were made by
weavers using hand-looms in their homes. Weaving was often not a sole occupation but combined
with farming, and production was dispersed throughout the countryside. Bengali textiles had
several outlets: local consumers, markets in upper India to which Bengal is connected by major
rivers, and exports to regions outside South Asia.10 By the end of 17th Century, Bengali textiles
were very popular in Europe, the “India Craze” of the 1680’s being one manifestation. Other
European companies including the Dutch, French, and Danish were active in the market. Trade
volume was large; Prakash (1976, p. 173) estimates that in the early 18th century Dutch and
English textile exports created 75,000-100,000 jobs.11 By the ﬁrst half of the 18th century, Europe
was the major export market.12 Besides European companies, local merchants and private traders
from Europe, India, and Asia sought to buy cloth. One source was the spot market, where a
"ready money" (khush khareed) purchase could be made. A buyer could also advance capital
to a weaver for purchase of inputs, including yarn, in return for a commitment to produce for
him — an arrangement called dadan. Such arrangements were advantageous to the weaver: he
received capital, and he was guaranteed (in principle) a buyer for his product. The buyer was
8In 1773, there were only 250 oﬃcers in the Company’s civil service in Bengal. European rank and ﬁle soldiers
and oﬃcers in the Company’s army accounted for only 3000 and 500, respectively, in 1769 (Marshall (1976, p.
15)). In contrast, an estimated 20 million people lived in the province of Bengal by the early eighteenth century
(Prakash (1976, p. 174)).
9After becoming a territorial power in eastern India, the Company itself was increasingly supervised by the
government in London which was concerned that Bengal was being mismanaged. As Griﬃths (1952, p. 156) puts
it, "a trading corporation could no longer be allowed to handle uncontrolled an empire in embryo." The Company’s
bargaining position was also weakened by its dependence on the government during ﬁnancial crises. The India Act
of 1784 set up a Board of Control to supervise administrative, revenue, and political decisions of the Company. The
Board of Control’s power grew steadily, and the Company’s privileges were gradually eliminated: in 1813 it lost
its monopoly trading rights with Europe; after 1833 its commercial operations were ended and the Company was
a purely political and administrative entity in India (the opium trade, a partial exception, is discussed in Section
IV.B.); ﬁnally, in 1858, after a large-scale rebellion in northern and central India, the British Crown directly took
over Indian administration.
10Chaudhury (1995, p. 147) lists South-East Asia, West and Central Asia, the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas,
and North Africa.
11Prakash (1976, p. 173) provides lower and upper bounds of 75,620 and 99,804. The workforce in Bengal
province at this time is estimated at 10 million, one million of whom were in textiles and raw silk taken together.
12See Chaudhuri (1978, p. 247).
5guaranteed (again, in principle) supply, made to speciﬁcations. Timely and assured procurement
was particularly important for European companies, whose ships made journeys lasting many
months. In its "Contract System" the EIC placed orders with local merchants who advanced
capital and procured cloth. In its "Agency System" the Company hired salaried employees in
order to deal directly with the weavers.
The EIC predominantly used the Agency System in the period we study, and we describe it
here in further detail. The EIC established “factories” - administrative oﬃces - in major towns.13
Each factory linked several collection centers, aurung, headed by salaried employees, gumashtas,
who served as the EIC’s agents.14 In the early years, agents posted bonds with the Company.
The Company gave agents funds to advance to weavers15 and speciﬁed the amounts and types
of cloth needed and a price schedule. The gumashta would contract with the weaver, advancing
the capital in return for speciﬁed cloth. If the gumashta received the cloth, he appraised it, paid
the weaver, and sent the cloth onward to the EIC’s factory. To recover the ﬁnal product, the
gumashta could use coercive measures, which varied in severity over the period we study. The
extent of gumashtas’ coercive power was a policy decision of the EIC. It is these policies which
we will discuss at length in Section IV.
There is considerable evidence that this system was plagued by opportunism of both agents
and weavers. Reporting on gumashta corruption, a contemporary observer, Bolts (1772), wrote:16
The roguery practiced in this department is beyond imagination, but all terminates
in defrauding the poor weaver; for the prices which the company’s gomastahs and in
confederacy with them, the jassendars [appraisers] ﬁxu p o nt h eg o o d sa r ei na l lp l a c e s
at least ﬁfteen percent and in some forty percent less than the goods so manufactured
13Chaudhuri (1978, p. 573) writes: "The term ‘factory’ at this time merely signiﬁed an establishment for the
merchants to carry on business from within a foreign country and it is derived from the word ‘factor’ meaning an
agent employed by the principal merchant."
14It appears that there was a single gumashta at each collection center. We could not determine the length of
time a gumashta typically served nor do we see evidence of tournaments.
15The Agency System policy when it was ﬁr s tf o r m u l a t e di n1 7 5 3s t a t e d :
“The substantial gomastahs approved of by the Board should be employed at the aurungs, giving suﬃcient se-
curity...that they undertake no other than the Honourable Company’s business on forfeiture of their wages and
allowance, that each gomastah have diﬀerent musters delivered to him for his guide....that no gomastah....be
entrusted with more than Rs. 20,000 at one time..." (Hossain (1988, p. 88)).
16Cited by Mitra (1978, p. 50). Though Bolts was likely biased against the EIC, his views on this matter were
widely shared, as we will see in Section IV.
6would sell in the public bazaar or market upon free sale.
For their part the weavers also often violated agreements, taking advances from the Company
but selling to other buyers, as we discuss further below in Section IV.
The EIC experimented with various policies to address these issues. Our analysis shows why
solving both problems was a diﬃcult task. The gumashta needed coercive power to secure the
sale of the cloth, but this power in turn gave the agent the ability to hold up the weaver. The
solution to one contractual problem created the other. We show the workings of transactions in
as i m p l em o d e l .
I I I .AM o d e lo fP r o c u r e m e n t
There is an export good produced using capital, k,a n dl a b o r ,l. A producer has the skill to
produce the good, but no capital. The exporter has the capital to produce the good, but no skill.
We normalize the interest rate to zero and set labor costs equal to the quantity of labor used.
There is ﬁxed proportions technology, where inputs k ≥ k and l ≥ l result in a single indivisible
unit of the good. The exporter has value v for the good, where v − k − l ≥ 0 so the good is
eﬃcient to produce.
We focus on one producer and one exporter, given there are many other producers and poten-
tially other buyers. We suppose, for simplicity, that other buyers would pay mv for the product,
where the parameter m, 0 ≤ m ≤ 1, represents the extent of competition. For example, m could
represent the extent to which the good is speciﬁc to the exporter who provides the capital. For
m =1 , the good is homogeneous, and there are other buyers willing to pay v for the output.17
We sometimes call mv the "spot market price."
A. Exporter-Producer Interaction with No Intermediary
The producer and exporter, with no intermediary, interact as follows: The exporter announces
ap r i c eP that it will pay for the good and an amount of capital k to advance the producer.
17The speciﬁcity of the good could be a choice of the exporter or the producer, and the model could accommodate
this possibility. The qualitative results would not change.
7The producer decides whether to accept the advance and then whether to produce a good. If he
produces, the producer decides whether to sell the good to the exporter or to another buyer. The
exporter decides whether or not to pay the promised price P.
If prices and all other terms are enforceable, the exporter simply sets P to maximize his proﬁts
Π = v − k − P, subject only to the producer’s participation constraint, P − l ≥ 0. The exporter
earns the full surplus from exchange.
When the producer’s decision to sell to the exporter is not enforceable, the producer could use
the capital for another purpose or produce output but sell to another buyer. This is the typical
problem studied in the development literature. The promised, and still enforceable, price must
then satisfy two incentive constraints: (1) P ≥ l + k so the producer has the incentive to use
labor and capital for production;18 and (2) P ≥ mv so that the producer has the incentive to sell
to the exporter. The exporter would set P =m a x {l + k,mv}, and its proﬁts are positive if and
only if m ≤ (v−k)
v and v ≥ 2k + l. The competition cannot be too strong so that a high price
erodes the exporter’s returns, and the value of the good must cover the producer’s incentive to
use capital for production.
B. The Exporter Hires an Intermediary
Now let the exporter hire an employee - an "agent" - to ameliorate this enforcement problem. The
exporter pays the agent a wage w ≥ 0. The agent’s responsibilities are to advance the capital to
the producer, collect the good upon its completion, pay the producer, and deliver the cloth to the
exporter. The agent has an outside opportunity to earn U, and we now assume v−k−l−U ≥ 0
so that the good’s value exceeds the agent’s opportunity cost as well as production costs.
Unlike the exporter, the employee has some capability to monitor the producer and enforce
the sale. This capability could derive from several sources. Public policies could grant agents
rights in enforcing contracts, e.g., by allowing them to enter homes and seize property. The agent
could have his own ability to sanction a producer through social connections, dunning, or violence.
We assume the exporter cannot always observe the agent’s interactions with the producer, and
18This incentive constraint is stronger than the producer’s participation constraint. Hence, we need work only
with the incentive constraint.
8the agent, by virtue of his coercive powers, could ultimately pay a price diﬀerent than P.19 The
exporter could, however, have some ability to aﬀect the agent’s power - either through its own
management practices or through its inﬂuence on public policy.
We capture the interaction between the agent and producer with a reduced form bargaining
model. Outside buyers would pay a price mv for the product. We suppose the agent procures
cloth and pays the producer (1 − β)mv,w h e r e0 ≤ β ≤ 1.20 We call β the power of the agent.
It summarizes the agent’s ability to prevent the producer from selling to another buyer, e.g.,
the ability to monitor the producer or harass and coerce him.21 Such mechanisms reduce the
producer’s return from outside sales. When β is low, the agent has little power and must pay the
producer close the spot market price to obtain the cloth. When β is high, the agent can obtain
the cloth from the producer at much lower than the spot market price.
We begin with the simplest case: β is exogenous, and it is a known constant value. We
later consider the case where the agent’s power is random and unknown to the exporter, but the
exporter can aﬀect its distribution.
The exporter, the agent, and the producer interact as follows (see Figure). The exporter
announces procurement terms - the capital advance to the producer, the ﬁnal good price P,a n d
the agent’s wage w. If the agent accepts, he gives the exporter a security Q in return for the
advance k, where Q>k. He then chooses how much capital to forward to the producer. The
producer then chooses whether or not to produce. If the product is made, the agent obtains the
cloth, giving the producer (1−β)mv. The agent then delivers the output to the exporter, receives
P, and recovers his security.22 If the agent did not forward the capital, he simply returns it and
19If the agent is able to completely enforce the debt/sales contract, and the exporter can perfectly monitor the
agent, we simply return to our perfect enforceability case with the addition of an agent participation constraint.
20The agent always obtains the good, as in equilibria of complete information bargaining games. But historically
producers often sold to outside buyers. Thus, we have a familiar dichotomy between historical events and "equilib-
rium" outcomes. We could specify that the agent has only a probability of obtaining the cloth, and this probability
is related to his power. This speciﬁcation would complicate the analysis without changing its basic message.
21We could further specify that, beyond recovering the cloth, the agent can extract some capital/cash from the
producer. Such a speciﬁcation would change the producer’s and agent’s incentive constraints. Hiring the agent
would be more valuable to the exporter. The producer would earn less rents, thereby matching some historical
accounts. Our qualitative results regarding the balance between agent and producer would again be similar.
22We could add an agent’s choice to sell the cloth on the spot market rather than to the exporter. In this case, the
exporter must set P ≥ mv to ensure procurement. The outcome, however, is identical, as the exporter ultimately
adjusts the wage to extract rents from the agent (see below). In the EIC textile case, Jones (1918, p. 38) mentions
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Timing of Interaction between Exporter, Agent, and Producer
Working backwards, we now have three incentive constraints. The producer will produce if
and only if his revenues exceed his opportunity cost of capital and labor:23
(1 − β)mv ≥ k + l. (1)
The agent will forward the capital if and only if he anticipates earning more from procuring cloth
than simply returning the capital to the exporter:
P − (1 − β)mv ≥ 0. (2)
Finally, the agent’s total earnings must exceed those in an alternative occupation:
P − (1 − β)mv + w ≥ U. (3)
The exporter sets P and w to maximize proﬁts Π = v − k − P − w subject to (1), (2), and
23This incentive constraint is stronger than the producer’s participation constraint, hence we will work only with
the incentive constraint.
10(3). Assuming the agent’s participation constraint binding,24 we have P∗ =( 1− β)mv, w∗ = U,
and exporter proﬁts of
Π∗ = v − (1 − β)mv − k − U. (4)
We can now see how procurement depends on the level of the agent’s power β.T h e p o w e r
must be high enough so that the exporter earns positive proﬁts, Π∗ ≥ 0, and low enough so that
the remaining constraint, the producer’s incentive constraint (1), is satisﬁed. Setting Π∗ =0
gives us a lower bound on β, and setting (1) as an equality gives us an upper bound on β :
1 −
v − k − U
mv




Procurement thus occurs only when the coercive power of the agent is neither too high nor too
low. We ﬁrst observe that (5) is not satisﬁed for any level 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 if v<2k+l+U or m<k+l
v .
If the exporter’s value is too low, his proﬁts are always negative. If competition is too low to
guarantee the producer enough return, he will not produce. When neither is true, procurement
will occur if and only if the power of the agent falls within the restricted range: the producer has
the incentive to produce, and the agent extracts suﬃcient surplus to give the exporter positive
proﬁts.
Hiring an agent is valuable only at high levels of competition. For low levels, m ≤ l+k
v ,a n
agent would not only harm proﬁts but shut down procurement altogether. When competition is
high, m ≥ l+k
v , the exporter earns proﬁts Π = v − k − mv when it does not employ an agent
and earns Π = v − k − U − (1 − β)mv when it does. The exporter will then hire an agent when
βmv>U , the gains from the enforceability capability of the agent exceed the cost of hiring him.
C. Exporter Can Inﬂuence Intermediary’s Power
If the exporter could choose the agent’s level of power, it would certainly do so. The exporter
would set β to exactly meet the producer’s incentive constraint (1). The exporter would adjust
the price P and wage w to meet the agent’s incentive and participation constraints, (2) and (3),
24Historically, agents were paid a positive wage, and with w>0, the participation constraint must be binding.
11and thus earn the highest possible surplus.
Most exporters are unlikely to have such control. While an exporter or government could
have a target level for agents’ power, they are not likely to know exactly how policies translate to
facts on the ground. There could be local variability in application of the policies, for example,
and variability in the relative bargaining strength of particular producers and agents. A foreign
exporter, in particular, is likely to face such uncertainties.
To capture these possibilities, suppose the agent’s power is a random variable 0 ≤ e β ≤ 1
with distribution F(β;B) and density f(β;B),w h e r e0 ≥ B ≥ 1 represents the power embodied
in the exporter’s policies or in public policies. For higher values of B, there is always a higher
probability that the agent has greater power: for B0 >B , F(β;B0) ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates F(β;B). To capture individual variability and the inability of the exporter to exactly
set the agent’s power, assume that any value of the agent’s power is possible even for very high
or very low B: f(β;B) > 0 for all β and B.
For simplicity, suppose the power level is realized after the exporter has contracted with the
agent, but before the agent has advanced the capital to the producer. The shock could be realized
at other points in time: before the exporter contracts with the agent, after the agent and weaver
contract but before production takes place, or after production. Nothing critical hinges on the
timing.25 We assume the agent and producer but not the exporter observe the realization.26
Now when the exporter sets the procurement terms, it does not know whether the two in-
centive constraints will be satisﬁed — this will depend on the realized value of the agent’s power.




















. The agent’s participation con-
25Our timing assumption simpliﬁes the model: the producer need not be risk averse. If some realization occurs
after capital is advanced, and the producer is risk averse, similar results obtain.
26With this assumption, the exporter cannot make the procurement price contingent on the realized level of the
agent’s power, which would make the analysis equivalent to the certainty case. This assumption follows our setting






[P − (1 − β)mv]f(β;B)dβ + w ≥ U, (6)
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when (6) is met. With the agent’s participation constraint (6) binding, for any B the exporter
maximizes expected proﬁts (7) by setting the price to P∗ = mv, ensuring the agent’s incentive





just meet the agent’s participation constraint.
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mv ) is the expected gain from enforcement given the producer’s in-






is decreasing in B. But decreasing B could diminish the exporter’s expected
returns.
There is an additional eﬀect of the policy B if the exporter is constrained to set a particular
price P.29 We will discuss such constraints on the EIC below. The probability the agent’s
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27For ease of exposition, let F be diﬀerentiable.
28This solution is consistent with w>0 (agent’s participation constraint is binding) when
v−k
v ≥ m.
29A price constraint would aﬀect the problem only if P<m v .
13Increasing B now increases the probability the agent’s incentive constraint is met, decreases the
probability the producer’s incentive constraint is met, and aﬀects the expected rents the agent
can extract from the producer.30
Hence, when choosing its policies, the exporter will strive to ﬁnd the right balance between
the agent’s coercive powers and the producer’s incentives.
IV. EIC Operations: Textiles, Opium, Land Taxes
A. Cotton Textiles
In its cotton textile venture, we argue, the EIC was largely unable to strike the right balance. The
EIC was still a "young" regime: a small group of Englishmen was governing a large, newly acquired
territory, with an unfamiliar language. Crime and banditry were rampant. The Company relied
on local intermediaries, and it was unable to monitor them well. Corruption among the EIC’s
upper management made oversight even more diﬃcult. The EIC was also likely constrained in its
choice of procurement price. In the 1720’s and 1730’s the Court of Directors in London began to
suspect that oﬃcers in India were overstating the prices they paid for cloth (Chaudhuri (1978, p.
300-301)). The Directors set the auction price in London as the benchmark for the procurement
price in India. But the benchmark was (i) determined as much as two years in advance, and (ii)
only loosely related to local production costs. Hence, there was often an "acrimonious debate"
(Hossain (1988, p. 73)) between managers in India and London over prices.31 The model shows
that such a constraint would make it yet more diﬃcult to strike the balance between agents and
producers.
30A foreign exporter, like the EIC, is unlikely to know the distribution F (β;B) and hence the precise tradeoﬀs
of raising and lowering B. The exporter could infer the results of its policies over time. A large literature studies
learning in an uncertain environment, where there can be a tradeoﬀ between actions that maximize current expected
proﬁts and those that increase a decision-maker’s information. See, for example, Rothschild (1974) and Easley and
Kiefer (1988).
31The cost of the Company’s military adventures in India also generated pressure to oﬀer low prices. It is possible
that, at times, the price did not cover production costs; Mitra (1978, p. 109-118) provides some evidence. But
even today it is diﬃcult to accurately measure costs in a family enterprise. For instance, modern farm management
surveys in India often ﬁnd that if family labor inputs are valued at market prices economic proﬁts can be negative
(Bharadwaj (1974, p. 45)). In our study, the weaver received an interest-free advance, and, hence, some implicit
compensation. Mitra’s extensive discussion of the distress caused by the eventual closure of the EIC’s factories in
19
th century suggests that weavers were making proﬁts (p. 178-181, 198-200). Still, low prices remain a plausible
factor in the Company’s procurement problems.
14Throughout the textile operations, we see the EIC’s struggle both to give agents enough power
and to give weavers suﬃcient incentives. After 1757, and especially after 1765, the Company’s
agents had much power to enforce sales agreements. Contemporary observers describe this period
as one where agents greatly exploited their positions. Bolts (1772) writes that agents undervalued
cloth and would harass producers, often seizing output to prevent sales to other buyers: "the
English Company’s gomastah ... set his peons over the weavers to watch him and not infrequently
to cut the piece from the loom when nearly ﬁnished."32
The Company began to face procurement problems. In 1768, Governor Verelst wrote the
Court of Directors in London of the decline:
Plenty has succeeded to famine and security has induced the natives to apply them-
selves again to labour and commerce, but the manufacturers are scarcely increased,
the aurungs are not so well-peopled as they were twenty years before.33
His explanation exactly follows the lines of our model. In trying to prevent opportunism by the
weaver, the Company had given too much power to the agent:
[I]t was thought expedient by the governor and council ....to make...advances to such
manufacturers as would otherwise have lain idle. Contracts thus in part executed on
one side, aﬀorded a temptation to fraud on the other; and the workman, unless strictly
watched, often resold his goods for their full price to a stranger. The gomastahs
or agents of the Company were necessarily therefore entrusted with powers which
they frequently abused to their own emolument; and an authority given to enforce a
just performance of engagements became notwithstanding the vigilance of the higher
servants, a source of new oppression (Verelst (1772, p. 85)).
Indeed, the Company’s perception, in the language of our model, was that weaver’s returns were
too low, and their incentive constraints were violated. The Court of Directors in London wrote
32Quoted by Mitra (1978, p. 50). Jones (1918, p. 38) provides a very similar description.
33See Mitra (1978, p. 52). The Court of Directors in turn communicated its unhappiness to the EIC’s management
in Fort William in 1771, comparing the “once ﬂourishing state of the commerce of Bengal with its present gradual
decline (Mitra (1978, p. 54))." As Marshall (1976, p. 56) points out, such generalizations applied to Bengal’s large
and complex economy could be much too broad. However, the narrower claim that the gumashtas were abusing
their powers and thereby hurting procurement is not in dispute.
15to the administration in Bengal in 1768: "We can ascribe your diﬃculties to nothing but the
oppressed state the weavers have been in for some years which has occasioned many to ﬂing up
their looms (Mitra (1978, p. 50))." The policy B was too high, leading to greater probability of
high realizations of agents’ power. Procurement problems continued after the famine of 1770, in
which up to a third of the population died. In Santipore, for example, the price of cotton yarn
rose by 25%, and the EIC raised procurement prices. But agents were accused of expropriating
the increase. The weavers complained that they were getting the same price as before because
the gumashtas were undervaluing their products (Mitra (1978, p. 64)).
In 1773, the Company decided to change course. It instituted regulations to give producers
"freedom of trade" and guard them against coercion. It also decided to try another means of
procurement, the "Contract System."
The Company’s new rules aimed to rein in the agents. Regulation IV of 1773 stated:
Whoever shall attempt, directly or indirectly, to force advances upon the weavers or
make them enter into engagements against their will or in any way exercise an undue
inﬂuence on them, shall be immediately suspended from the Company’s service (Sinha
(1956, p. 170)).34
A 1775 legal notice reinforced this Act, warning gumashtas that weavers’ freedom to deal with
other buyers should not be restricted, and that they would be punished for violations (Hossain
(1988, p. 112)). In terms of our model, such regulations reduce B. The producer’s constraint is
then violated less frequently, but the agent has less ability to enforce sales. And indeed now it
was the agents’ turn to complain that weavers were not delivering cloth (Wright (1961, p. 203),
Mitra (1978, p. 55), Hossain (1988, p. 113)).
In response, another set of regulations was introduced in 1775, with the aim of increasing the
agents’ power. Agents were authorized to post a peon at a defaulting weaver’s house to compel
him to work. Weavers who secretly sold to other merchants while they were still in arrears to the
34If the gumashta had excessive power, he could not only violate the price terms, but force the transaction on
the weaver in the ﬁrst place. It is diﬃcult to assess how common this phenomenon was, but weavers’ petitions do
complain about forced advances. Also, the fact that Company passed regulation forbidding this practice suggests
that it did occur.
16EIC could be taken to court and punished (Mitra (1978, p. 56)).
In 1775 the EIC began its experiment with the Contract System, before returning exclusively
to the Agency System in 1788 (Sinha (1956, p. 151), Mitra (1978, p. 134)). The EIC contracted
with merchants who agreed to supply certain amounts and types of cloth at pre-speciﬁed prices.
The Company gave advances to merchants, but merchants made their own deals with weavers.
In the framework of our model, w =0 , and the intermediary charges the exporter a price P
that ensures his own incentive and participation constraints are satisﬁed. Our model shows these
diﬀerences by themselves would not have any impact on procurement, which ultimately depends
on the intermediary’s coercive power. If B i st h es a m ef o rt h em e r c h a n ta sf o rt h eC o m p a n y ’ s
agent, the producer’s constraint is violated with the same probability, and procurement problems
remain. This is what happened, for reasons we explain next.
The Contract System involved another set of agency issues. As a company, the EIC could
not eﬀectively oversee the local allocation of contracts. Commercial Residents had shared in
gumashtas’ illegal proﬁts under the Agency System and would not easily let go of them. Contracts
were thus given to Commercial Residents themselves or to merchants in cahoots with them.35
These merchants acted virtually in the same manner as the company’s agents, with the backing of
the local company: "The contractors regarded themselves as the Company’s representatives and
the Company also let them freely use the power of coercion in the Company’s name (Sinha (1956,
p. 151))." Procurement problems persisted. For instance, in 1780 the contractor of Sonargang
increased the number of quality gradations to twenty-four (!) thereby creating "so many openings
to defraud the weavers" (Sinha (1956, p. 162)). Sinha’s general assessment regarding procurement
by the Company was that the two systems ultimately worked - or did not work - in exactly the
same way: "After 1757 circumstances shaped in such a way that Agency or Contract did not
matter much as far as Indians were concerned (1956, p. 21)."36
35The Company allowed its British employees to engage in private trade, but not between Europe and Asia
(Hejeebu (2005), Cases-Arce and Hejeebu (2002)). Here the Company was using its own British employees as
merchants to obtain goods for its European trade.
36Wright (1961, p. 204) quotes an oﬃcial from Patna who, in 1777, complained about both weavers and mer-
chants: "I do not mean by this representation of the conduct of the weaver to insinuate that there are no faults on
t h es i d eo ft h ec o n t r a c t o r .F a rf r o mi t ,f o rIe v e rh a dt h ei d e at h a ti na l lt h eb u s i n e s si nt h i sc o u n t r yw h e r ei ti s
necessary to employ intermediate agents there must be some misdemeanours and which, whilst matters remain on
their present footing, it will be out of the power of the most strenuous exertions entirely to prevent."
17Reports of weaver opportunism persisted, and the EIC responded further. Proceedings of the
Board of Trade in 1783 told of weavers using the Company’s interest-free advances to buy lower-
quality threads and selling to private merchants.37 One way to hide these sales was to weave
in another house. A slew of regulations in the 1780’s then aimed to punish buyers and sellers
of cloth under contract to the EIC.38 Regulations passed in 1787 and 1789 set punishments and
ﬁnes for weavers failing to meet delivery schedules.
With this backing, EIC intermediaries - agents and merchants - continued to siphon oﬀ rents.
And we see protests from weavers. In 1787 weavers of Narainpur and Savar complained of fraud,
and weavers of Sonargaon, Titabadi, and Bajitpur objected to a "strong and artful combination
of gomastahs, the inferior arang servants and the principle [sic] weavers of every district (quoted
by Hossain 1988, p. 169)." In 1794 the weavers of Dacca wrote that “Cloths of 2100 threads
were taken as 2000 threads letter C and D....” as the Commercial Resident colluded with the
appraisers and gumashtas to undervalue their cloth (Mitra 1978, p. 81).39 Board of Trade
documents from 1815 and 1818 - near the end of the textile venture - show continued evidence of
opportunistic behavior by gumashtas (Ghoshal (1966, p. 11)).
If the Agency System did not work well, why did not the Company adopt an alternative
structure, as suggested by today’s industrial organization theory? Why did not the EIC establish
a vertically integrated ﬁrm, where it owned the ﬁxed capital (looms), bought the inputs (yarn),
and hired producers (weavers) as employees? Why did not repeated interaction between the EIC’s
agents and the weavers overcome the enforcement problems?
Vertical integration would have been diﬃcult for several reasons. The weavers were mostly
37See Mitra (1978, p. 66). In a similar vein, in 1786 the Resident of Malda complained of “the unfair practice
of selling clandestinely to individuals cloths manufactured for the Company” (Hossain (1988, p. 118)).
38The Regulation of April 1782 announced that “the purchasers of the said cloths, apparently knowing them
to be the property of the Company, by the secret and clandestine way manner which they take to procure them
or by the notoriety of the weavers being in the Company’s employ who oﬀers to dispose of them, on proof of the
fact, shall be liable to punishment by the Adaulat [court] according to the nature of their oﬀence and the cloths so
purchased shall be conﬁscated" (Mitra (1978, Appendix IA, p. 222)). Regulation XIV in 1786 addressed a loophole:
"Whereas it has been alleged that the Company’s weavers cannot be distinguished from others it is hereby ordered
that a list or register of the weavers employed by the Company in every pergannah be stuck up by the Commercial
Agent..." Regulation XI warned weavers not to sell cloth "either by himself, any of his family or by any agent, to
any other merchants or dealers whatever, whilst he is deﬁcient in his deliveries..." (Sinha (1956, p. 153)).
39Similar complaints against gumashtas are included in petitions from 1795 and 1801, reproduced in Mitra (1978,
p. 253-235).
18part-time agriculturists and scattered over a huge area.40 I tw o u l dh a v eb e e nq u i t eac h a l l e n g et o
have weavers leave their homes and farms to work in a centralized location. In addition, vertically
integrated structures involve a diﬀerent set of agency problems. Weavers and supervisors would
all have to be monitored or given incentive contracts in order to perform their work well.41 In the
Agency System, the weavers were residual claimants. It is possible that decentralization, with its
faults, ultimately provides better incentives than vertical integration.
Theory and realities on the ground point to several reasons why repeated interaction was
unlikely to lead to cooperation in our setting. First, discount rates were high:42 Colonial Bengal
was a society in ﬂux. Weavers and agents likely did not know how long their relationships would
continue. There were “shocks” of various kinds: a major political transition; the massive famine
in 1770 which may have killed as much as a third of the population; frequent changes of EIC
personnel;43 numerous policy changes, which we have documented; and law and order problems.44
In such an environment it may have been rational for all parties to maximize short-term proﬁts.
Second, active markets and the presence of outside options makes cooperative relations more
diﬃcult to sustain.45 To eliminate this factor, buyers would have to cooperate with each other,
and producers as well. E.g., producers share information and collectively boycott any buyer
that behaves opportunistically. And buyers collude. The EIC and its rivals could have divided
the markets geographically and promised not to poach each other’s weavers. Indeed, the Dutch
Company did suggest this. The EIC did not agree — after gaining political hegemony it wanted to
dominate the trade, not share it. As for weavers, they were too geographically dispersed to form
a successful cooperative. Moreover, they likely feared prosecution by the EIC and persecution by
40K.N.Chaudhuri (1978 p. 241) writes: “There were few villages and towns in Coromandel and Bengal, as Orme
aptly observed, where at least a few families of weavers could not be found.” He attributes this regional dispersion
in Bengal (as compared to, say, Western India) to the availability of easy transport via inland waterways.
41Mitra (1978, p. 41) reports that the weavers in the royal workshops were under “incessant inspection.”
42Even when players have low discount rates, it is important to remember that the Folk Theorem indicates that
any outcome is possible. A cooperative equilibrium where agents and producers fulﬁll contract terms would be as
likely as an equilibrium where they act opportunistically.
43Life expectancy among the EIC’s civil servants was low. Marshall (1976, p. 219) reports that 59% of those
entering in the period 1756 to 1766 died in India, compared to “only” 44% entering in the period 1767-1775.
Hejeebu (2005) reports that the median length of service was 9 years. Death was the reason for 75% of departures
in the ﬁrst ﬁve years and 66% of departures in the second ﬁve years.
44The Company had weakened the authority of the zamindars (landlords), and its own police force was ineﬀective
into the early nineteenth century. Crime and ‘dacoity’ (banditry) were rampant. See Marshall (1987, p. 130).
45See Kranton (1996) and Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002).
19social superiors aﬃliated with EIC upper management (Hossain (1988, p. 177)).
Thus, the contractual problems continued to the very end. It is conceivable that, over time, as
the EIC’s administrative capacity improved, it would have streamlined the textile procurement
process. But we will never know. In the early 1800’s, as the industrial revolution took oﬀ,c l o t h
manufactured in England eliminated the EIC’s Bengali cotton textile trade. To see a "mature"
EIC in operation we will have to study the Opium Monopoly.
B. The Opium Monopoly
In the opium venture, we argue the EIC’s administration and later that of the Crown were better
able to strike the balance between agents’ power and producers’ incentives. As an oﬃcial and
largely enforceable monopsony, the EIC limited producers’ opportunities for outside sales. At the
same time, the EIC invested in an institutional apparatus to monitor its own agents. Finally, the
EIC was also able to set the procurement price largely without constraint. Our model indicates
that these features, in combination, lead to high procurement and high exporter proﬁts: m is low,
the exporter can set P, and the exporter can precisely target agents’ power β with its policies B.
After the Battle of Plassey in 1757, EIC oﬃcials saw another money-making opportunity: the
opium trade centered around Patna (Bihar). After several decades of policy experimentation, in
1797 the Company set up an Agency System for monopoly procurement of opium in Patna and
in another procurement center, Benares.46 Under the Opium Agency private cultivation of poppy
and sale of opium were banned. Via its agents, the Company gave capital advances to farmers
who were required to grow poppy on a speciﬁed area, harvest the juice, prepare raw opium, and
deliver it to agents for payment minus advances and deductions for quality defects. Large amounts
of opium were procured, most of which was auctioned in Calcutta to private traders who sold
it in China. The Opium Agency earned enormous proﬁts, which constituted as much as 17% of
government revenues in 1858-59.47 On various occasions the Agency, like a textbook monopolist,
46British opium trade went through four phases: (i) After 1757, private participation by Company oﬃcials, whose
control of the market grew with EIC domination, (ii) After 1765, formal declaration of a monopoly controlled
p r i v a t e l yb yt h e s eo ﬃcials, (iii) From 1773, a monopoly run by and on behalf of the Company, using the Contract
System, and (iv) From 1797 onwards, a Company monopoly using the Agency System. The Contract System was
abandoned following complaints that now sound familiar: corruption in awarding of contracts, abuse of peasants
by contractors, and adulteration of opium.
47In 1775 Warren Hastings decided that opium proﬁts would be governmental revenue rather than private com-
20increased revenues by adjusting its supply according to demand, all the while maintaining the
high quality for which its opium was famous.48 The Opium Agency remained in place for more
than a century.49 Why was it so successful?
The Opium Agency, we argue, better addressed the procurement problems that had plagued
the textile trade. Especially in the early years, we see many complaints of opportunism by
farmers and agents. Agents often cheated farmers. Peasants in Saran (1811) and Shahabad
(1812) submitted petitions complaining that gumashtas were under-weighing their raw opium
(Singh (1980, p. 168)). Chowdhury (1964, p. 55) describes the ﬁndings of an 1820 report
that "pointed out that the peasants hardly got anything from poppy, almost the whole amount
having been misappropriated by zillahdars [intermediaries]." In 1832 the Deputy Opium Agent of
Fatehpur wrote to the Board of Customs, Salt, and Opium: “It appears to me that two principal
circumstances form the chief obstacles to an extensive poppy cultivation in this district, viz., the
inadequate price the cultivators receive for their opium and the oppression to which they are
subjected from the gomastahs (Singh (1980, p. 249))." There were also reports that peasants
were forced to grow poppy, especially when the Agency was trying to quickly increase output
(Chowdhury (1964, p. 50), Owen (1934, p. 108-109)). We also see familiar complaints about
producers’ behavior. They cheated on quality; Trocki (1999, p. 62) writes that adulteration of
raw opium with sugar, poppy rubbish, earth, or ﬂour was a persistent problem. Farmers also
tried to sell to smugglers, at least in part because the prices they received from the Agency were
too low: The head of the Opium Agency in Bihar claimed, in 1817, that because its price was
low “more than half of those who take advances receive them with a view of smuggling a certain
portion of the produce (quoted by Chowdhury (1964, p. 28))."
We argue the Opium Agency was ultimately able to manage these enforcement problems
because, ﬁrst, it had market power, and second (relatedly), it established a system to monitor
mercial proﬁts for the EIC (Richards (1981, p. 67)).
48In 1831, facing competition from opium produced in the western Indian region of Malwa, the EIC decided to
ﬂood the market. Within ﬁve years it had tripled the output compared to the previous decade. In the early 1850’s
when prices were beginning to fall, it maintained revenues by reducing production from 50,000 chests to 21,000
chests (Owen (1934, p.108, 183)).
49The Bihar agency was closed in 1910. The Undersecretary of State for India announced the end of the opium
trade to China in 1913 (Owen (1934, p. 348)).
21its agents. In our model, market power has several implications. The value, v, of obtaining the
product would be large. Opium was a lucrative commodity: It sold at auction for amounts well
above procurement prices. For instance in 1820-21 in Bihar, peasants received 3 sicca rupees per
seer and the auction price in Calcutta was 54 sicca rupees (Singh (1980, p. 173)). A monopsony
also implies a small m: Regulation VI of 1799 declared contraband trade in opium punishable
by imprisonment (Singh (1980, p. 172)). Though smuggling was not completely eradicated, the
situation was quite diﬀerent for opium than for textiles, where in some locations only a third of
the weavers worked for the Company (Mitra (1978, p. 165-166)).
While producers’ lack of outside options could give agents greater opportunities for hold-up,
it appears that, precisely because opium was so lucrative, the Agency invested in systems of
authority and supervision. Richards (1981, p. 70) argues that by the Crown period a "systematic
bureaucratic structure" had evolved.50 Each Opium Agency (Patna and Benares) was managed
by a British oﬃcer and had numerous sub-agencies (16 for Benares and 11 for Patna), which
were also manned by British oﬃcials (the Sub-Deputy Opium Agent and his assistant). Each
sub-agency was, in turn, linked to 3-4 kothis or sub-divisional oﬃces, which were handled by
an Indian oﬃcer titled gumashta,o ra g e n t . T h egumashta had a support staﬀ of twenty-ﬁve
clerks, soldiers, and “opium patrol oﬃcers.” The gumashta dealt with a village intermediary,
often the village headman. At the start of the Opium Year (September 1), the gumashta and
the Sub-Deputy Opium Agent negotiated with the village intermediary who drew up a list of
peasants who would grow opium. A license was issued in each name. When signed acceptance
was returned to the Agency’s representatives, farmers received interest free-advances, usually
in 2-4 installments. Around April the village intermediary notiﬁed the peasant to appear at
the kothi where the opium was weighed, graded, and examined for adulteration in the presence
of the British Assistant Sub-Deputy or another oﬃcer (Richards (1981, p. 76)). By the 1860’s
chemical tests were being used for adulteration, which would have further reduced the gumashta’s
discretion (Trocki (1999, p. 98)).51
50As mentioned earlier, in 1858 the British Crown dispensed with the Company and took over administration of
India.
51Historians widely comment on another feature of the Opium Agency: the high price of opium did not translate
into substantial gains for farmers. Even the most favorable assessment (Richards 1981, p.79) ﬁnds that farmers’
22Improvement in the Company’s (and subsequently the Crown’s) administration in India also
played an important role in checking opportunism: the management of the Opium Agencies was
signiﬁcantly less corrupt than its counterpart in the textile venture. The transition is dated from
the mid 1780’s with a shift from "aﬄuence to integrity as a measure of value" (Misra (1977, p.
53)). During Cornwallis’ tenure as Governor-General (1786-1793), eliminating corruption was
a priority. Salaries were increased and private trade by Company servants was banned. The
nineteenth century brought greater improvement. Company oﬃcers spent three years at a college
in Haileybury before coming to India; inﬂuence peddling (in London) for appointment became less
salient, and in 1853 competitive entrance exams were introduced. This management had much
discretion over procurement prices. Chowdhury (1984, p. 314) provides one example: in the
1850’s, following a decline in cultivation, the Agency increased its procurement price by 42%.52
With the development of an eﬀective institutional apparatus and professional staﬀ,i ta p p e a r s
that opium procurement became completely routinized. John Rivett-Carnac, of the Indian Civil
Service, ran the Benares Opium Agency for twenty years from 1875-1894 and wrote his successor-
to-be that, while the job was not very challenging, it "oﬀered this advantage, that here a man
might towards the close of his service make a comfortable and quiet haven for later years in India
(Rivett-Carnac (1910, p. 303-304))."
C. Land Taxes
The history of land tax collection in Bengal lends support to our analysis of the EIC’s procurement
ventures. Land taxes were the largest source of revenue for the East India Company. In collecting
these taxes, the Company relied on intermediaries, and we see familiar tradeoﬀs in setting their
l e v e lo fc o e r c i v ep o w e r .
In 1793 the Company established the famous "Permanent Settlement," a radically new way
to collect land taxes. The Company granted land ownership in return for yearly taxes, whose
incomes stabilized, rather than increased. Thus, it appears that the Opium Agencies, because they could better
regulate the coercive power of their staﬀ, were able to procure consistently even as they extracted a lion’s share of
the surplus.
52We see further evidence of the Agency’s ﬁnancial ﬂexibility in its policy, at times, of interest-free loans for
poppy cultivators to dig wells (Owen (1934, p.107), Richards (1981, p. 75)).
23nominal amount would never change. The new owners were zamindars, who had largely collected
taxes on behalf of pre-colonial rulers and whom the EIC had used as intermediaries since 1777.
Under the Permanent Settlement, the zamindar owned the land, and the land would “positively
and invariably”53 be sold if the zamindar did not pay the tax. This system simpliﬁed the complex
pre-existing property rights and tax collection relationships with which the Company had grappled
since its arrival (Sinha (1968), Guha (1963)). It was also grounded, at least somewhat, in economic
logic: Cornwallis believed the zamindar would have an incentive to develop his property since,
with secure ownership and a ﬁxed tax, he would earn any gains in productivity.54
To pay his taxes a zamindar had to collect rents from tenants, and we see that the EIC
struggled to ﬁnd a balance between the two parties. The Company speciﬁed the zamindar’s
coercive powers in a series of Regulations, and disputes were adjudicated in District Courts.55
To limit the burden on these courts, and "for the convenience of parties residing at a distance
from the seat of justice (Firminger (1917, p. 57)," Indian judicial oﬃcers known as "Native
Commissioners" were authorized to adjudicate suits for small sums.
The Proclamation of 1793 which established the Permanent Settlement seemed to favor ten-
ants. It eliminated the zamindar’s traditional right to jail or physically punish a defaulting tenant.
The zamindar could “distrain” (seize) the tenant’s personal property — crops, cattle etc., but this
distraint had to be withdrawn if the tenant provided security and contested the claim in District
Court. The tenant’s seed grain, implements, and cattle physically connected to the plough could
not be attached if there were other assets available (Banerjee and Ghosh (1977, p.xiv)).
These regulations, however, apparently gave too little power to zamindars. They complained
that it was diﬃcult to collect rents. Moreover, they charged that larger tenants were tying them
up in court, while the government promptly sold their land when they failed to pay the taxes.
In response, in 1795 the Company eased the restrictions on the zamindar’s power. The
zamindar no longer had to withdraw the distraint of property when challenged in court (Sinha
53See Article VI of the Proclamation of March 22, 1793, Harrington (1814-15, Volume II, p. 198).
54See Governer-General’s Minute September 18, 1789, in Firminger (1917, Vol. II, p. 511). Of course, ﬁxing the
tax in nominal terms is contrary to current economic thinking.
55See our overview of the EIC’s administrative history above. To protect the property rights of zamindars,
revenue oﬃcials ("collectors") could no longer serve as judges.
24(1968 p. 171)). After giving the tenant three days’ notice, the zamindar could approach the
district judge to jail the tenant after a summary investigation (Islam (1979, p. 54)).
Even these measures were considered inadequate, and in 1799 the to-be-notorious Regulation
VII was passed. The zamindar could now sell the distrained assets while waiting for a judicial
decision (Islam (1979, p.64)). If the zamindar feared that the tenant might abscond, the zamin-
dar could appeal to the Native Commissioner who, even without investigating the facts, could
arrest the tenant and bring him before a district court judge. Most importantly, the Regulation
speciﬁcally allowed the zamindar, on his own authority, to coerce a tenant:
....[N]o part of the existing regulation was meant to deprive the zamindars and other
landholders of the power of summoning, and if necessary of compelling the attendance
of their tenants, for the adjustments of their rents, or for any other just purpose
(Chatterjee (1864, p. 89)).
Now, it appears, the zamindars had too much power — a “blank cheque” — according to
some historians (Sinha (1968, p. 171)). British revenue oﬃcials reported that zamindarsw e r e
abusing their powers to extract exorbitant rents. Tenants deserted in some areas (Chowdhury-
Zilly (1982)). The revenue oﬃcials noted these complaints but also worried that reforms might
swing the pendulum too much in the other direction:
.....Great caution therefore must be observed not to relax too much in favor of the
ryots [farmers], lest we should run into the other extreme, and aﬀord them, by the
abuse of the protection which the law aﬀords, the means of withholding the just
payment of their rents (Islam (1979, p. 69)).
New regulations were ultimately passed in 1812, this time to protect the tenant (but see
below). The defaulter’s assets could no longer be sold without court permission. (Islam (1979, p.
70)). The zamindar had to withdraw the attachment if it was contested in court, with the tenant
providing security (Harrington (1817, Vol. III, p. 529)). The cattle connected to the plough,
seed-grain, and implements were now unconditionally exempt from seizure (Chatterjee (1864, p.
95)).
25In the regulation of zamindar and tenant, we see parallels to the textile and opium ventures.
We see much legal back-and-forth reminiscent of the textile agents and weavers.56 From the
second half of the 19th century, the emphasis shifted to providing security of tenure and rent
protection for tenants. This increased willingness to intervene and regulate reﬂected the regime’s
growing administrative capacity described earlier in the context of opium procurement.57 The
Zamindari system was abolished shortly after colonial rule ended in 1947.58
V. Present-Day Example: Contract Farming
Agency systems and similar arrangements abound in today’s developing world. Multinationals
and parastatals often use "contract farming" to procure commodities for export, such as coﬀee,
cotton, and fruit.59 Buyers advance credit or inputs to the grower. Growers are then supposed to
deliver the output and receive a quality-contingent ﬁnal price, minus any debt repayment. Buyers
sometimes also provide technical assistance. Enforcement problems appear to be widespread:
producers default on advances often by engaging in outside sales, and buyers renege on price
commitments often by manipulating quality criteria.
A variant, indeed a simpliﬁcation, of our model captures the essence of these problems. An
important distinction between the EIC and today’s buyers is that the latter do not control state
power. When multinationals and parastatals cannot regulate high levels of coercive power like
the EIC, in our framework B would be low. The probability of procurement then depends on
the parameter m, which captures the extent of market competition. We could model the level of
competition as random, like we did the level of agents’ power. When m is high, the producers
56In another parallel, ﬁnancial imperatives led to a high land tax (just as the EIC was likely constrained in its
textile prices). High taxes left little surplus for zamindar and tenant to share, with defaults on either side. Islam
(1979, p. 25) calls the tax ﬁxed in 1793 “unbearably high in the context of the conditions of the zamindars at that
time.” Even Marshall (1987, p. 144), who takes a more moderate view, suggests that the land tax for Bengal was
roughly 20% higher in real terms in 1793 than in 1757.
57When the Permanent Settlement was introduced, the Company was aware of customary norms protecting
tenants from arbitrary eviction and rent increases. It introduced a law requiring landlords to provide ten-year
leases, specifying rents. This rule was rarely enforced and widely opposed, and was rescinded in 1812, oﬃcially
giving the zamindar a free hand in his dealings with tenants. In essence, the Company knew it lacked the capacity
to regulate landlord-tenant relations, and merely reserved the right to intervene in the future. It did so in the
Bengal Rent Act of 1859 and the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885.
58However, its eﬀects appear to have persisted post-independence (Banerjee and Iyer (2005)).
59It is argued that in some instances, a concern about nationalization and union activity are behind preferences
for contract farming rather than plantation farming.
26will be tempted by outside sale opportunities, and the buyer who initially advanced the capital
will incur losses. On the other hand, when m is low the buyer will be able to pay a very low price
and hold-up the grower.60
A good example of the problem in competitive environments (high m)i sJ a ﬀee’s (1994)
account of the travails of Kenya Horticultural Exports (KHE), which exported fresh produce in
the 1980’s. KHE’s contract farming scheme fell apart in 1985: prices increased because of a
drought, and farmers sold their crops to other exporters at higher prices. The KHE was unable
to recover many input loans. Attempts to rescue the scheme were unsuccessful, as more than a
dozen exporters were operating in the area, ready to poach on KHE’s eﬀorts. Jaﬀee (p. 125)
reports that eventually "the lesson learned by KHE managers from this experience is that in
the competitive trading environment that characterizes Kenya’s fresh produce trade, contract
farming arrangements are not sustainable." In a similar vein, Brambilla and Porto (2005) report
that in Zambia, after agricultural liberalization in the 1990’s, contract farming in cotton faced
increasing problems of default following entry by new ﬁrms.
On the other hand, lack of competition (low m) allows buyers to behave opportunistically.
Hightower (1975, p. 17) reports that Del Monte paid American asparagus growers almost nothing
(0.0005 cents per pound) for rejected produce. The company alone had the right to judge quality,
and, with no alternative, farmers had to accept these prices. Clapp (1994, p. 94) describes a
case in Guatemala when, faced with a surplus of production, ALCOSA, a subsidiary of Birdseye,
exploited an escape clause which the illiterate farmers were unaware of, and unilaterally suspended
purchase in a village named Chimachoy. Two-thirds of the farmers found no other buyer and one-
third did not even bother to harvest the crop.
VI. Conclusion
The message of this paper thus far may seem excessively bleak to some readers. In only one
case we have studied, the Opium Monopoly, did the exporter achieve the balance between its
60In his analysis of contract farming in Thailand Siamwalla (1978) provides an intuition similar to ours, using
the term "shifting costs:" when costs are low, markets are competitive and buyers will be reluctant to advance
capital; when costs are high, markets are monopsonistic and buyers will capture most of the surplus.
27representatives’ power and producers’ incentives. Given the ubiquity of arrangements like the
Agency System, surely there must be more instances where opportunistic behavior is checked.
We conclude with two examples of successful ventures, each illustrating a class of solutions to the
problems we have highlighted.
Institutions in manufacturing towns in Gujarat (in Western India) in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries facilitated cooperative relations between buyers and producers.
Consider the following description of Ahmedabad provided by Mehta (1984), using late 19th
century sources.61 Producers in a given occupation (weavers, potters, etc.) lived and worked
together in distinct neighborhoods; merchants also lived close to each other, in a diﬀerent part
of the city. Each occupational group had its own association. Caste and religious ties facilitated
cooperation. Members of each group agreed to act collectively to punish transgressions by their
own members and to retaliate against members of other groups when necessary. Merchants often
advanced either raw materials or cash to artisans. But they could not "exploit" the artisans
"beyond a point" because the artisans "could always act through the powerful mechanisms of the
Panch [their association]." Merchant associations were also vigorous in defending their members’
interests.62,63 In such a setting, hold-up problems may be infrequent because of fear of collective
retaliation, and procurement should occur smoothly.
Closed communities provide another way to counter opportunism, with institutions for dis-
pute resolution, mechanisms for social sanction, and a strong shared sense of identity. Tirthankar
Roy’s (1997) description of the Sourashtras in the South Indian town of Madurai is one exam-
ple. The Sourashtras are a successful and close-knit migrant community, quite aware of their
distinct origins. Their traditional occupation is the production and sale of textiles, and the com-
munity includes both weavers and merchants. There is a norm of transacting within-group: most
61Hopkins (1902) and Gazetteers produced by the colonial government describe a similar social structure in towns
like Bharuch and Surat.
62Haynes (1996, p. 306), studying the jari (gold thread) industry in the Gujarati town of Surat in the early
twentieth century describes how artisan families formed long-term relationships with merchants and could "change
patrons only when a new bidder for their services oﬀered to pay their old debts."
63An interesting example of cooperation among merchants in the silk industry comes from another region. Ac-
cording to the Report of the Bihar and Orissa Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee, 1929-30 (p. 92) the mahajans
(moneylenders), who had given advances to weavers, had “a sort of trade combination to protect their unsecured
debts. No weaver can go to another mahajan without a certiﬁcate of discharge from his old mahajan.”
28Sourashtra weaver families work in "stable putting-out contracts with Sourashtra merchants" (p.
44). In Roy’s study, which spans the late nineteenth to the late twentieth centuries, there is no
mention at all of the types of opportunistic behavior we have examined. This absence of contract
breach is consistent with his emphasis on the cohesion of the Sourashtras. Roy quotes an early
20th century monograph that holds the Sourashtras were "very keen to stick to truth in their
dealings." He concludes that "common identity ensured that trust was not betrayed" and that
agency costs were thereby avoided (p. 462). Of course, there is now a literature in economics
that explains how repeated interactions within a closed community can facilitate cooperation and
contract enforcement.64
I nt h i sp a p e rw eh a v es t u d i e dt h em i c r o e c o n o m i c so fe x p o r tp r o c u r e m e n t .W eh a v ee x a m i n e d
the problems of contracting between exporters and local producers - problems that must be
overcome for globalization to fulﬁll its promise of raising incomes of the world’s poor. A well-
functioning legal apparatus could enforce contracts and check opportunism on both sides. Public
investment in such an apparatus would be socially eﬃcient if the future gains from trade are
high. In the absence of formal contract enforcement, our model indicates the market structure
and a balance of bargaining power are critical to the success of procurement operations. Export
eﬀorts are then likely to be most successful when (1) production and export both take place
within the same community that mobilizes the various forces that sustain cooperative behavior,
(2) producers and exporters work as collectives to reduce outside sales and punish opportunism
on both sides, and (3) a monopsony invests in its own enforcement apparatus that checks its own
opportunistic behavior.
64For prominent examples see Greif (1993) and Clay (1997). See Kandori (1992) for the general theory of repeated
games and community enforcement.
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